West’s judgement is soundly argued, and it is understandable from the perspective of a viewer who attends an exhibition in search of ideas worked through an aesthetic form. The harvests display language in the form of idiosyncratic notation, but their notes do not travel across the distance between the viewer and the event. The words, circles, and other signs fall short. They get lost in the gap between the sociality of a workshop and the time and space of the stranger to that sociality. Like graffiti that is intended to communicate only to those who understand its public shorthand, the harvests do not actually include those who are absent from the moment in which people gathered and spoke to one another. The writing left behind in them is dysfunctional in a conventional sense; it is not entirely independent of presence.
Notes made during an artistic process typically stay internal to that process. They are not evaluated alongside the eventual form that takes its place in an exhibition. But ruangrupa and their collaborators sought to upend the logic by which the viewer encountered a finished thing, a form that could stand independently of its process and the various interlocutors involved. They asked the art world to suspend the usual circus of proper names, which privileges the latest aesthetic insight of Artist X and Artist Y. They asked the viewer to attend to the sociality inherent in making instead. Their harvests represent the inacessibility of that gathering of people to those who come after and wish to see and know what took place. They are a notational system better understood as a form of refusal than as an effort to communicate. “You who were not here will not have the knowing” – that is what the harvests explain to me and West and the other art critics who traveled to Kassel to evaluate the exhibition.
There is an argument to be made about refusal as part of ruangrupa’s response to a neoliberal demand for transparency in communication, or to coloniality’s demand that those perceived to be from elsewhere explain themselves (preferably in English, French, or German) in clear and precise language so that their legitimacy in a given space can be firmly established by the authorities. I will not make either argument here, however. What I am really curious about is how this refusal echoes the many similar evasions I encounter in the art academy in which I teach when I try to convince my students to take writing—their own and others’—seriously.
In every writing class I have taught so far, an especially forthright student has made some variation of the statement, “But that would kill the work,” which translates, I think, to, “What is the point of explaining what the artwork means, or how it came to mean something, when the artwork is supposed to be able to convey an experience of that meaning?” What I have learned from my largely unsuccessful negotiations thus far is this: in their view, were my students to be successful in their articulation by West’s criteria, they would run too great a risk of exposing the artwork to unbending understanding. The problem with this position is that, in the worst cases, it allows students to wallow in formalism without having to justify their choices. Art has never actually spoken for itself; it has always been conditioned by institutional and rhetorical structures that authorize it and support both its value and its meaning, often tethering these together. To claim otherwise is, in my view, an inexcusable depoliticization of art. Yet there is an echo in reverse of West’s disgruntled dismissal of the harvests, as though each position assumed the importance of the artwork’s autonomy from language.